Table of Content

Futures of Modernity: An Introduction
Michael Heinlein, Cordula Kropp, Judith Neumer, Angelika Poferl and Regina Römheld | 7

COSMOPERLITANIZING EUROPEAN MODERNITY

Thinking beyond Trajectorism
Arjun Appadurai | 25

Cosmopolitan Hope. A Comment
Natan Sznaider | 33

Ironic Politics – Politics of the Future?
Wolf Lepenies | 37

The Triple Challenge
Zygmunt Bauman | 43

WORLD RISK SOCIETY – CLIMATE CHANGE IN A COSMOPOLITICAL VIEW

Ordinary Catastrophe: Outsourcing Risk in Supply-Chain Capitalism
Anna Tsing | 51

Reflexive Modernity Brings us back to Earth. A Tribute to Ulrich Beck
Bruno Latour | 65

Living the Winter of Discontent: Reflections of a Deliberative Practitioner
Maarten Hajer | 77

The Political Contradictions of Second Modernity
Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger | 95
The controversy prompted by the thought and writings of Ulrich Beck over the multifaceted dynamics of the fundamental transformation that modernity is undergoing under conditions of globalization raises new kinds of challenges for politics and everyday life worldwide, but especially for a social science that deals with these issues. At issue is what conclusions should be drawn from the recognition that, neither in the West nor at the level of global pluralism, are modern societies the normatively integrated formations developing in linear ways as which they were characterized and described, for example, by the long-dominant structural functionalism (see Schwinn 2006). The plural, contingent present of global modernities points, on the contrary, to worldwide processes of reflexive modernization and to the interrelation between successfully enforced goals of modernity and the dynamic of unintended side effects. These very side effects of the process of modernization represent the driving force of an epochal transformation that is changing the coordinates of this transformation itself toward a modernization of modernity (Beck and Bonß 2001; Beck and Lau 2004) and is directing it into new, hitherto unexplored channels. The authors of this book have made it their task to survey this other modernity that is overlooked and concealed by linear conceptions of modernization and to address the production of uncertain social futures in the present.

Multiple futures

The contours of a ‘world society’ (Beck 2009) that are beginning to take shape can no longer be described and explained in terms of the categories of social science that take their orientation from the framework of the industrialized nation state and the apparent exclusivity of European or Western modernity. Global risks – such as, for example, climate change and terrorism – the question of global social inequality, the increasing plurality, multi-directionality, and
Inequality: From Natural »Facts« to Injustice
On the Political Sensibility of the Individualized Human

RONALD HITZLER

Across an ongoing debate about plausible explanations for the causes, emergence and cessation of social inequalities, there has for some time also been discussion in the social sciences about appropriate descriptions of society with regard to social inequalities which are relevant to order. This means, then, that most discussion centres on whether we still, or no longer, or once again live in a society which can be adequately portrayed by the traditional models of classes and strata. Both the class model and the stratification model have been linked with ideas about overcoming the inequalities observed in each case. At present, however, it looks more as though social inequalities do not disappear »beyond« the class society or stratified society, but, on the contrary, grow and multiply (cf. Beck and Sopp 1997). At the same time more recent debates about phenomena of exclusion (cf. e.g. Bude and Willisch 2006) report a radicalization and exacerbation of social inequality.

Inequality as a Natural »Fact«

One of the things which again needs explanation here, or which needs a new explanation, is the old question of where the multifarious inequalities actually come from. Our everyday experience already teaches us that people are undoubtedly diverse. They differ in all kinds of respects – and so markedly that we can distinguish every single one as an unmistakable individual.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in his Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondements de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes (1754/1910), was only willing to acknowledge natural differences between humans with regard to age, health, physical strength, and strength of mind and spirit; apart from this, he painted an influential picture of prehistoric man as noble and solitary but otherwise not unequal to his own kind. A good hundred years ago, however, the English researcher Francis Galton, a distant relation of Charles Darwin, began to examine the question of inequality between humans
empirically, rather than just reflecting on it in a philosophical and speculative manner. Galton in fact studied the most diverse forms of difference between humans (e.g. body size, sporting ability, but also intellectual performance). In doing so he evoked the question of the influence of hereditary factors on social inequality – highly controversial, then as now – and developed this into the research field of eugenics, which would, politically, entail some disastrous consequences (Galton 1865, 1869).

This interest was connected to the research of Darwin, the «father» of the theory of evolution. Darwin, as we know, had been looking for a scientific theory for the diversity of vegetable and animal life forms. In the process he resorted to older, speculative ideas (e.g. those of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe), positing that the species had developed gradually, i.e. that nature was changeable. Darwin realized that the development of living beings could be explained purely by natural processes. A basic assumption of his theory here is that members of the same species differ to a greater or lesser extent, and that these differences are in part hereditary. Most of these qualities, partly random, partly inherited, are unimportant for the individual’s chances of survival and particularly of reproduction, many are detrimental to its survival or that of its possible descendants, but a small number of them improve the relative chances of surviving and in particular of reproducing successfully. Thus qualities which reduce the chances of reproduction disappear rapidly, or gradually, from populations, whereas characteristics which increase the chances of reproduction obviously become more and more widespread. Some populations also develop divergently. New characteristics lead, for example, to the exploration of new ecological niches, or natural disasters cause the extinction of populations in some areas, perhaps with the exception of an (initially) small number of specimens with special biological features etc. Thus new species, races and types keep emerging, in the interplay between environmental conditions and the natural diversity of the individual organisms.

A key factor here is the phenomenon of the so-called mutation, the erratic, undirected, i.e. random modification of the genetic material. This is where the famous process of natural selection begins, following the simple criteria of harmfulness, irrelevance, and advantage — always with reference to the mutant’s chances of survival and reproduction, it should be noted. A further factor in the Darwinist scenario is sexual reproduction, which — due to the principles of heredity — inevitably leads to the mixing of characteristics in the offspring. So if, more or less by chance, two individuals with different advantageous characteristics mate, then these particular characteristics may perhaps be united in their offspring, making them particularly capable of surviving and/or reproducing. This could also be expressed differently: Darwinistically speaking, the first thing indispensable for the development of the species is difference. But in these terms the individual organisms belonging to a species are no longer just different, but actually unequal with regard to their respective chances of life, and here this refers particularly to their chances of reproduction. The chances of survival of a species in competition with other species and in a changing environment thus correlate not only with biological differences, but also very much with the natural inequality between individuals of this species.

Individuals of the same species not only are (genetically and phenotypically) diverse, their inequality is also — if they belong to a species which lives socially — recognized and acknowledged by members of the same species: mates are selected according to externally perceptible indicators of the differing reproductive fitness of the «candidates». Understood in this way, i.e. with a view to individual chances of life and reproduction, inequality stabilizes social orders in populations. The best-known case is probably the pecking order in the chicken run. Of course there are occasionally (or repeatedly) not only changes in the social order — e.g. because of aging processes or status transitions (female with and without young) or because of environmental influences, etc. — but also what might be called «revolutions». But however changes take place: the positions in the structure are merely redistributed, not abolished altogether.

**Political implications of scientific positions**

As mentioned, Francis Galton investigated the natural inequality resulting from genotypic and phenotypic differences, specifically between humans. That is, he examined both how biological differences are processed socially (e.g. differences in appearance, age, gender etc.) and to what extent social inequalities can be explained as «natural». This formed the essential basis for the exploration of presocial conditions of social inequalities; this in turn brought forth theories whose quintessential nature is probably most concisely and clearly expressed in what is known as «Herrnstein’s Syllologism» (named after the psychologist Richard J. Herrnstein, who taught at Harvard):

1. If differences in mental abilities are inherited, and 2. if success requires those abilities, and 3. if earnings and prestige depend on success, 4. then social standing [...] will be based to some extent on inherited differences among people. (Herrnstein 1971; also Herrnstein and Murray 1994).

1 | Many animals, furthermore, know each other individually and their behaviour towards one another reflects this familiarity. This has been observed in apes, particularly by Frans de Waal, Jane (Lawnick)-Goodall, Diane Fossey, Barbara Harrison and Birute Galdikas. There are also, however, corresponding accounts, e.g. from Konrad Lorenz, Nico Tinbergen and other ethologists (dogs, cats, but also songbirds, seem to have individual voices, by which members of the same species identify them).
To sum it up even more briefly: according to theories of natural inequality, the social opportunities of individuals are already unequally distributed because of their genetic make-up. Karl Marx, incidentally, saw it the same way; in justification of his maxim »From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs« he observed in the *Kritik des Gothaer Programms*: »The one, however, is mentally or intellectually superior to the other [...]« (1962). »Innates«, strictly speaking, refers to everything an individual is born with. But not everything is determined by heredity. Prenatal injuries, whatever may have caused them, are innate, but are not the result of defective genetic material. Irrespective of this, the issue of innate qualities is essentially about genetically inherited qualities which continue to significantly influence or determine individual life processes after birth (e.g. numerous physical characteristics which only develop over the years).

In particular, the question of whether mental or intellectual differences between humans have only social or also or even primarily presocial causes is still a constant point of contention between human ethologists and behaviourist milieu theorists. In 1969 Arthur R. Jensen exposed himself not only to massive criticism but also to a number of personal attacks when he asked, in the *Harvard Educational Review*, »How Much Can We Boost IQ and Achievement?« (Jensen 1969), and answered to the effect that compensatory education programmes did not significantly improve levels of intelligence, since differences in intelligence were mainly genetically and not socially determined. This was particularly sensitive because Jensen looked at the statistically significant differences in intelligence between »black« and »white« U.S. recruits, as established by representative surveys, and suggested that they might be based on genetic differences between the races.

What is uncontroversial so far is that if differences in intelligence are determined by heredity, they are certainly not just controlled by one gene, but are caused by a complex interplay of a number of genes. Staunch proponents of the theory of environmental influence, however, argue that the genes which create the prerequisites for intellectual performance are the same for all humans, and that if there are differences in intelligence, then these can be ascribed to the fact that humans are exposed to different environmental influences. Beyond such diametrically opposed positions – which continue to exist – experts in the field today tend to regard humans as biosocial beings, i.e. as determined by their genes and their environment. It then follows that both genetic defects and harmful environmental conditions have a detrimental effect on the way an individual lives his or her life. And consequently, the »nature«/»nurture« controversy (Pastore 1949), which reached its peak in the 1970s, and of which traces are still in evidence today, has for some time been considered obsolete (Ingold 2001).

Neither the genetic disposition nor factors of social environment explain individual behaviour, but both obviously explain the *boundary conditions* of individual behaviour. And both together must presumably »somehow« explain the inequalities between individuals. The most simplistic calculation here is *addition*: i.e. it is assumed that hereditary and environmental components can be clearly separated, and that when they are simply put together they will add up to 100 per cent of the existing differences. And yet the calculation does not seem to work out quite so simply after all: certain genes, for example, react differently to the same environmental variables; certain environmental conditions, for example, clearly show up the difference between two genotypes, while others attenuate these differences or level them out altogether (e.g. muscles in various body types, in active bodybuilders and »couch potatoes«). This means that hereditary dispositions and environmental conditions »somehow« interact. This relationship cannot, in any case, be represented as a simple matter of addition.

Another non-additive component which is particularly significant in intelligence research is what is known as *covariance*. That is, genotype and environment vary together (television makes the »stupid« stupider and the »clever« even cleverer. In more general terms: an intelligent person will derive more intellectual stimulation and challenges from the environment than a less intelligent person). It then becomes impossible to determine for certain where the actual intelligence ultimately comes from. But all these theories are based on the assumption that differences in intelligence are always, whatever the extent, *partly determined* by genes. A representative example is the position advocated by the geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky in *Genetic Diversity and Human Equality* (1973), that hereditary dispositions shape IQ to such an extent that the IQs of monozygotic twins brought up separately correlate more strongly than those of dizygotic twins brought up together. Studies of this kind are highly controversial today; the discussion on the influence of »the genes« points less to unambiguous knowledge than to a highly complex set of interrelationships (and similar tendencies can be seen, for example, in developments in neuroscience). It is obvious, however, that these different »assets« do not simply mark biological differences, but that they »naturally« also find expression in various forms of social inequality (e.g. in the different distribution of responsibilities and thus of hierarchies).

The conclusion to be drawn from such theories of natural inequality, a problematic conclusion, particularly for intellectuals trained in the social sciences, is – to put it in simplified terms – that it is fundamentally impossible to train up a whole population of intellectuals, and that every scheme aimed in this direction is »naturally« doomed to failure. And of course the acceptance or denial of innate differences in ability has grave political consequences: if humans are, by nature, equal, then existing differences are the effects of different living conditions and will disappear when these conditions are equalized. In the context of social problem-solving, this has led to the well-known policies of compensation and adjustment, focused on the semantics of »equal opportunities« or »justice«. If, however, humans are unequal – in part – by nature, then egalitarian conditions will only further reinforce the existing differences.
SOCIAL INEQUALITIES AND INDIVIDUALIZATION

The usual sociological approaches to explaining social inequalities are »scattered« from theories of class struggle to organic metaphors about the »social body«. Class antagonisms in particular have always occupied a central position in theories formed within in the social sciences (to mention only Karl Marx, Max Weber and, among the more recent classics, Pierre Bourdieu 1982). Even in gender studies, the class model is still important; theses positing a »dual« and »triple« socialization and oppression (Becker-Schmidt 1987; Lenz 1996) make reference to it, and the current discussion on intersectionality (cf. e.g. Klinger and Knapp 2008) also persists in working over the relationship of »class«, »race«, and »gender«.

The most important alternative to class theories is undoubtedly the organic model of social strata developed in structural functionalism. According to this model, the inequalities present in a society are functionally necessary to preserve this society's »balance«. The model assumes that the resolving of functionally significant problems must be appropriately rewarded, so that enough »talented« people are prepared to take on the roles and positions which have to be filled (cf. Davis and Moore 1945). According to this, social inequalities arise and achieve stability by way of a market of supply and demand, so to speak. For some time, however, there have been considerable, mainly empirical objections to these structural-functionalist assumptions (cf. e.g. Mayntz 1961; Soliga 2009). In particular Ralf Dahrendorf (1957) once again connected the model of social stratification with a conflict-based approach inspired by the old theory of class struggle. One of the tenets of this conflict theory is that the main way in which social orders are stabilized is that dominant groupings impose norms and thus legitimize the given hierarchy.

In relation to the »new social inequalities«, however, all these attempts at explanation appear too static: they are exclusively limited to large, stable groups, they only register vertical inequalities, and they concentrate entirely on positionings and conflicts related to the profit-oriented economy. In other words: theories of class and stratification are by no means false as models, but they seem insufficient for the description of or misleading in the analysis of the post-industrial multi-option risk society which currently exists (and shows no signs of departing). In this post-industrial multi-option risk society (Gross 1994; Beck 1996, 2007), a number of inequalities which cannot or can no longer be captured with and in the traditional models of vertical stratification become relevant to everyday experience and to description by the social sciences. This by no means implies the assertion that »objective« social strata no longer exist. On the contrary, it can be assumed that class affiliation still has a huge influence on the individual's opportunities in life. At the same time, this affiliation goes hand in hand with multiple other relevant experiences of inequality – at least in people's

conscious biographical orientation. These other recently perceived inequalities are evidently connected with something which, since 1983, has been discussed using the term »individualization« or »process of individualization« (Beck 1983; cf. also Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1994, 2002).

The protagonists of this approach do not understand the process of individualization as a (dramatic) phenomenon of self-realization aiming at »individualism« or »individuality«, but essentially as a functional consequence of changes in the social structure of modern societies – such as: universalization of the principle of equality, juridification of ever more areas of life, expansion and devaluation of education, dissolution of normal working hours, increase in the average level of prosperity (»elevator effect«), erosion of the model of the nuclear family as a relatively binding element of culture etc. – especially after and since the Second World War. The main phenomena considered to be effects of the process of individualization include loss or renunciation of lasting normative ties, release from internalized roles, increased mobility, transfer of meaning from the professional to the private sphere, dissolution of the remnants of »feudal« relationships (especially between man and woman), more frequent changes in partner, focus on self-help groups or interest groups. To quote Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (1990: 12 f.):

»The proportion of life possibilities which are fundamentally closed to decision-making is decreasing, and the proportion of the biography which is open to decision-making and can be created by the individual is increasing.«

And, according to Jürgen Habermas (1988: 238), »this individual, who is simultaneously set free and isolated, has no other criteria at his disposal than his own individual preferences«. The crucially new thing about this is that something which has always applied to a few people is increasingly required of more people, i.e. that they lead and structure their own lives without reliable directions.

AN AMBIGUOUS TREND

This individualized human is a person who is released from traditional ties to a milieu, but also from the care of a milieu: a person who no longer sees himself as being in a relationship of direct responsibility towards others, but who is directly connected, so to speak, to the omnipresent but barely tangible entity of society as a whole, or to its economic, political, judicial, medical institutions etc. He is involved in a number of relationships which he himself has created and can dissolve, is confronted with different situations, and must therefore constantly deal with diverse, non-coordinated schemes of interpretation and action. Being-able-to-choose and having-to-choose thus seems to have become a
standard problem in his way of life. Of course this individualized human is a "homunculus", a theoretical construct, a one-sided, exaggerated portrait of us all – we who continue to cultivate and put up with our little family, local and class ties. But the juridification of interpersonal relationships on all levels, for example, is making perceptible progress, since anything that is not juridified does not seem or no longer seems to have "binding" force for the individualized human. Social stratifications in fact seem less and less to be predetermined by fate, and instead increasingly arise from temporary involvement in some associative structures or other (see contributions in Hitzler et al. 2008).

In contrast to this finding on the situation of "modern man", sections of gender studies are now ascertaining that the concept of individualization is essentially only conceived in terms of the standard male biography, and that the liberation from traditional ties and the margins of freedom thus opened up are much greater for men than for women. They argue, for example, that the typical reality of a woman's life is still shaped by the double burden of family and career. Despite these surviving traditional ties, however, there has undoubtedly been a push towards individualization in the context of the typical female life as well – and this is attended by new uncertainties and inequalities (even between women). Women's levels of educational certification, for example, have risen considerably, and their participation in the labour market is not simply "stabilizing"; rather, paid employment is becoming an increasingly self-evident component of the typical female lifestyle.

In contrast to the assumption, still cultivated in the more traditionalist areas of sociology, that humans still typically live in stable relationships, the theory of individualization states that we are fundamentally subject to existential uncertainty today. And that means: even if our current situation in life appears stable on the outside, we are, on a near-permanent basis, not just placed in positions where we have to choose and decide, but also confronted with new plans, schemes and decisions of other people, which surprise us to varying degrees. And in the resulting unstable situation (unstable in terms of social structure, amongst other things), a confusing multitude of new inequalities develops. Analysts of social structure and inequality researchers have thus been trying hard for some time to penetrate this "new complexity" of social phenomena of individualization, particularly with recourse to concepts of order such as situation in life, life course and lifestyle, and to reconstruct it by means of adequate models.

Now one may categorize many of the new antagonisms as luxury conflicts under the conditions of what Ulrich Beck has termed "Vollkasko-Individualisierung" ("fully ensured individualization") (as was perhaps symptomatic of West Germany in the 1980s). But it is hard to overlook the fact that where the traditional direct disputes over the allocation of resources are losing their importance or are highly ritualized (as the collective bargaining between unions and employers traditionally is), other, more indirect, more unregulated disputes over the allocation of resources are breaking out: e.g. in the form of covert discrimination or open violence against foreigners, against people with disabilities, old people, and also against members of the opposite sex. All this is of course further exacerbated when a long period of economic prosperity gives way to a phase of recession. That is, it appears that the advent of new inequalities (again) reinforces the need to mark belonging and non-belonging, familiarity and foreignness, civilization and barbarity, and to undertake processes of inclusion and exclusion along social demarcation lines of this kind.

**DIFFERENCE – INEQUALITY – CONFLICT**

Thus at first glance it looks as though social inequality is already the key to analysing the dynamics of political conflicts in our society as well. That is and is not true: human diversity does not in itself imply social inequality, and nor does social inequality generate social or political conflict merely by its existence. In both cases, there must be another element: diversity alone – e.g. with regard to eye or hair colour, weight, shoe size, age, leisure pursuits, but also with regard to personal opinions, skin colour or gender – does not explain different situations in life or opportunities in life. In order for diversity to become social inequality, it must be unequally evaluated, and entail consequences for a person's positioning in social space. This positioning is based on cultural attributions and social definitions and – analytically speaking – directs attention towards empirical processes of differentiating, classifying, valorizing or devalorizing, overglorification and stigmatization in all facets and nuances of social relationships and forms of social intercourse.

In this way the «new inequalities» broaden the palette of the old inequalities rather than replacing them: health, for example, is no longer seen as natural or God-given, as a matter of fate, but as a manufactureable commodity which should in principle be equally accessible to every human. Similar ideas apply to cultural resources of every kind. And with the new social inequalities, in a trend which has clearly been increasing again of late, the «classical» social question (the question of the just distribution of social wealth) is supplemented or even (e.g. in phases of prosperity) supplanted by the so-called ecological question (the question of the just distribution of the risks and hazardous situations produced by industry and technology). We therefore speak of «social inequality» when individuals and groups, or aggregations of individuals, have different opportunities in life because of qualities ascribed to them or acquired by them, or when they are allocated unequal proportions of social budgets because of their position in the social structure. The mere existence of social inequality, on the other hand, by no means signifies in itself the existence of a social or political conflict. This can perhaps be best illustrated by the relationship between the sexes: we all
know that the undoubted bio-sexual diversity of men and women has led to very different opportunities in life for the two sexes in most cultures – stabilized by genderings, i.e. by constructions of binary concepts of gender which lead to hierarchic gender orders. But in most cultures the generally striking inequality of men and women has not led, over the millennia, to collective conflicts between the sexes. The inequality between the sexes has only been politically virulent in the industrialized societies for about a hundred years. And it was only in the second half of the last century that this inequality developed into a potentially explosive conflict which (so far) shows no signs of abating.

This can be explained by the fact that, as explanations for the inequality between the sexes with reference to orders transcending society (God, nature etc.) have become subject to doubt, this inequality has come to be seen (with a sufficient degree of consensus) as unjust, with reference to the political and moral ideals of modern, bourgeois societies, particularly the ideals of freedom and equality. Technological progress, war and post-war periods and labour requirements, as well as better education, new methods of contraception and higher levels of professional activity have gradually increased women's potential for conflict. The inequality of the sexes was (and is) politicized as discrimination against women or as an emancipatory struggle against this discrimination. At present, however, the clash between women and men seems to be shifting again, towards a conflict between more family-oriented and more career-oriented people of both sexes. That is, in the relevant discourse the so-called issue of women is increasingly turning into the issue of mothers, and in general social discourse it is gradually turning into the issue of parents. The simple difference between people who are raising children and those who are not entails quite different opportunities in life in different cultures: in premodern societies, especially simple ones with subsistence economies, children are an economic resource for their parents, and an important provision for old age. In simplified terms: in premodern societies, children make parents richer, so to speak. In welfare-state conditions, on the other hand, as we all know, children become a luxury for parents, diminishing their individual resources and – at least for one parent, usually the woman – hampering or thwarting their professional careers. At present this inequality between people who are bringing up children and people who are not is increasingly being defined as unjust – and mainly, as we all know, with reference to aspects of demographic policy (e.g. pension security and the intergenerational contract).

The upshot of all this is that the political aspect of social inequality lies in the issue of social justice. In other words: the potential of any social inequality to cause conflict results from questioning of its legitimacy. So: not every difference automatically causes social inequality. And not every social inequality is felt to be unjust. Many differences, however, lead to social inequalities. And these days more and more social inequalities or their consequences are defined as unjust, making them – in a broad sense – politically virulent. For nearly everything which impinges noticeably on the ideals of freedom and equality seems unjust to us as modern people. This fundamental fact is also being studied at present in new approaches to a cosmopolitan sociology of social inequality (Beck 2008; Pofelek 2012).

Thus it is primarily the ideal of justice cultivated in modern societies which tends to lead to the problematization of every form of social inequality. The ideal of justice turns inequalities into central grievances which can flare up into conflicts at any time, and generalizes the social struggle for resources and opportunities in life. As a result the traditional lines of conflict between classes and strata are in part replaced, in part supplemented by various short-lived, scattered, interwoven antagonisms. This in turn destabilizes traditional habits of interaction, and means that the forms of social intercourse have to be renegotiated and reorganized. One question which is at present unresolved is whether, in these ongoing processes of transformation, we as a society can bear to consider (with renewed intensity) the possibility of natural inequality – and the political direction this might entail – rather than excluding this possibility from the outset. Of course we would also have to bear in mind that, under the condition of reflexive modernization, it is becoming more and more difficult to distinguish what is given by nature from what can be created or achieved in or by society – especially when we are dealing with ever more extreme forms of manipulative intervention in human life, based on medical technology, medication and therapy, and with other culturally available practices by which people produce their own outer appearance and inner state, physical and mental competence and performance – in short, a vast range of optimization programmes (cf., in the context of reflexive research on modernization, Lau and Keller 2001; Viehöver et al. 2004).

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